logo

한국어

토론 마당

로그인 후 자유로운 글쓰기가 가능한 게시판입니다.
이 게시판은 RSS와 엮인글이 가능합니다.
이 곳의 글은 최근에 변경된 순서로 정렬됩니다.
* 광고성 글은 바로 삭제되며, 민주주의법학연구회의 설립취지에 어긋나는 글은 삭제 또는 다른 게시판으로 이동될 수 있습니다.
* 관리자에게 글을 쓸 때, 옵션의 "비밀"을 선택하시면 관리자만 글을 읽을 수 있습니다.
* 글을 쓰실 때 개인정보(주민등록번호, 주소지 등)이 유출되지 않도록 주의해주십시오
조회 수 : 8474
2003.08.07 (12:24:13)
북핵 문제의 본질은 부시 정부의 왜곡과 편견이라는 명쾌한 주장입니다.

시걸 박사는 93-4년의 전쟁위기와 제네바합의의 과정에 관하여 미국 내 최고의 전문가라고 할 수 있습니다.

아래는 중앙일보 기사와 이어서 볼티모어 선지 원문을 모두 첨부합니다.
-------------------------------------------------------------

 
"부시정부가 北核정보 왜곡"
미 北전문가 시걸박사 

미국의 조지 W 부시 행정부가 북핵 문제에 대한 정보를 왜곡해 미국의 대북정책을 강경 일변도로 몰아가고 있다고 북한 문제 전문가인 리언 시걸(사진)박사가 5일 비판했다.
.
전직 뉴욕 타임스 논설위원으로 뉴욕 소재 미 사회과학연구원(SSRC) 선임 연구원인 시걸 박사는 이날 일간지 볼티모어 선에 '거짓말과 사실'이란 제목의 기고를 통해 "부시 행정부가 북핵 문제에 대해 세가지 거짓말을 하고 있다"고 지적했다. 다음은 기고문 요약.
.
부시 행정부는 그동안 북핵 문제와 관련, '협상 무용론(無用論)'을 주장해 왔다. 이 주장에 따르면 북한 지도부는 이미 원폭 개발을 결심했다. 따라서 북한과의 그 어떤 협상도 성과를 거둘 수 없다는 것이다. 그러나 이는 사실이 아니다.
.
북한 당국은 그동안 수차례에 걸쳐 플루토늄 및 우라늄 방식에 의한 핵개발 계획을 폐기할 의사가 있음을 밝혀 왔다. 물론 북한은 자신이 핵개발 계획을 폐기하는 대가로 미국으로부터 불가침 보장과 경제제재 해제 등의 보따리를 받아내고자 한다.
.
부시 대통령은 지난 3월 6일 "미국은 제네바 합의를 준수했으나 북한은 이를 어기고 우라늄을 농축했다"고 말했다. 부시 대통령은 제네바 합의와 관련, 백악관 참모들에게서 잘못된 정보를 들은 것 같다.
.
미국도 제네바 합의를 어겼다. 제네바 합의 제2조는 '북한과 미국은 정치.경제적으로 완전한 관계 정상화를 추진한다'고 명시하고 있다. 그러나 미국은 북한과 정치 관계를 정상화하지 않았다.
.
또 미 행정부는 공화당의 반대로 북한에 약속한 중유도 제때에 공급하지 못했다. 또 제네바 합의에 따라 2003년까지 완성하기로 한 경수로 건설 약속도 지키지 못했다. 미국은 대북 경제제재 해제 약속도 못 지켰다.
.
부시 행정부가 주장하는 '북한 붕괴론'도 잘못된 것이다. 이 주장에 따르면 북한은 붕괴 과정에 있으며 해상봉쇄 등 경제제재 조치를 취할 경우 북한체제를 쉽사리 무너뜨릴 수 있다. 그러나 이는 잘못된 주장이다.
.
봉쇄조치가 효력을 발휘하려면 남한과 중국이 반드시 참여해야 한다. 그러나 서울과 베이징(北京)은 모두 대북 봉쇄를 꺼리고 있다. 북한에 대한 무분별한 봉쇄조치는 북한체제의 붕괴가 아니라 핵개발만 가속화할 공산이 크다.
.
최원기 기자<brent1@joongang.co.kr>
.
2003.08.06 18:21 입력 / 2003.08.07 08:33 수정

http://www.sunspot.net/news/opinion/oped/bal-op.northkorea05aug05,0,2338944.story?coll=bal-oped-headlines
N. Korea: Fibs vs. facts













 
By Leon V. Sigal

August 5, 2003



WHILE ITS faith-based intelligence and downright deceptions about Iraq are now being exposed, the Bush administration has been just as misleading about North Korea.

North Korea has grudgingly accepted multiparty talks. It had been balking - not, as administration officials suggest, because it was insisting on bilateral talks with the United States, but because Washington has shown no interest in negotiating.

In three-way talks in Beijing in April, North Korea made a proposal to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear programs. Allies South Korea and Japan want the Bush administration to make a counterproposal, but it has not. Yet administration officials say they seek a "diplomatic solution."

Winston Churchill would have called that a "terminological inexactitude." That phrase was Mr. Churchill's way around a rule in parliament against accusing fellow MPs of lying. The Bush administration is propagating other inexactitudes on North Korea, all of them designed to keep talks from turning into negotiations and all of them at odds with the facts.

One is that North Korea is determined to nuclear arm, so negotiating is an exercise in futility. Yet Pyongyang has said repeatedly it will accept a verifiable end to both its plutonium and uranium programs and yield any weapons it has. It will not give them away for nothing, however. It wants a written pledge from the United States not to attack it, impede its economic development or attempt to overthrow its government.

It insists on dealing directly with the United States, whether or not China, South Korea, Japan and Russia are at the negotiating table, because none of them can give security assurances on behalf of the United States. For the past two years, it has been talking nonstop with South Korea and Japan to ensure that they provide aid and investment as part of any nuclear deal.

North Korea will let U.S. inspectors monitor its nuclear sites, but it won't submit to international inspections until Washington ends what Pyongyang calls its "hostile policy."

North Korea will keep reprocessing plutonium and generating more spent nuclear fuel in its Yongbyon reactor. It will also continue to build gas centrifuges to enrich uranium. It wants an agreement in principle committing America to satisfy its security and economic concerns before it will stop.

This is intended to underscore North Korea's basic stance that if the United States remains its foe, it feels threatened and will seek nuclear arms and missiles to counter that threat, but if the United States ends enmity, it says it will not.

Does North Korea mean what it says? There is no way of knowing for sure without putting an offer on the table that satisfies both sides' interests. History does suggest the North is willing to deal. Under the Agreed Framework of October 1994, it froze work at facilities that by now could have been generating at least 30 bombs' worth of plutonium a year. That is a real nuclear weapons program. Its enrichment effort, by contrast, won't be ready to produce much weapons-grade uranium until mid-decade at the earliest, according to U.S. intelligence.

A second inexactitude advanced by the administration is that the United States kept its word but North Korea cheated. As President Bush said March 6, "My predecessor, in a good-faith effort, entered into a framework agreement. The United States honored its side of the agreement; North Korea didn't. While we felt the agreement was in force, North Korea was enriching uranium."

His advisers misinformed him. The fact is, Washington got what it most wanted up front, but it did not live up to its end of the bargain. When Republicans captured control of Congress in elections just days after the Agreed Framework was signed, they denounced the deal as appeasement. Afraid of taking them on, the Clinton administration backpedaled on implementation. It did little easing of sanctions until 2000. Reactor construction was slow to get under way. Although we pledged to provide the two reactors "by a target date of 2003," we did not pour the concrete for the first foundation until August 2002. We did not always deliver heavy fuel oil on schedule. Above all, we did not live up to our promise, in Article II of the Agreed Framework, to "move toward full normalization of political and economic relations" - to end enmity and economic sanctions.

When Washington was slow to fulfill the terms of the accord, Pyongyang in 1997 threatened to break it. Its acquisition of technology to enrich uranium from Pakistan began soon thereafter. That was a pilot program, not the operational capability that the North moved to acquire in 2001 - after the Bush administration refused to negotiate and instead put it on a target list for nuclear attack.

A third inexactitude is that North Korea is on the verge of collapse and that an economic embargo and naval blockade will bring it down. But trying to compel North Korea will provoke it to nuclear arm a lot sooner than to collapse. A strategy of strangulation cannot be effective unless all of the North's neighbors are willing to join in. None is willing to. They know exactly what the Bush administration has yet to learn, that pressure without negotiations won't work with Pyongyang.


Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York and author of Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton Press, 1999).



Copyright &copy; 2003, The Baltimore Sun

 
Tag List