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2007.01.04 (01:45:47)
미 네오콘들의 한반도 정책은 아마도 대 중국 정책을 떠나서는 이해하기 힘들지도 모르겠습니다.
아래는 미국 네오콘들의 사이트인 '새로운 미국의 세기를 위한 기획(Project for the New American Century)'에서 퍼온 것인데요, 그 사이트( http://www.newamericancentury.org )의 동아시아 부분의 글들을 보면, 그들의 중국에 대한 관심과 경계가 얼마나 큰지 실감하게 됩니다. 그리고 그 가운데 대북 정책에 대한 권고도 간혹 끼여 있는 것을 볼 수 있습니다. 당연한 얘기인지도 모르지만, 미 부시 정부의 대북정책은 그들의 동아시아 전략이라는 큰 틀에서 이해되어야 할 것입니다.
이번 글도 제목은 '아시아에 나토를'이라고 되어 있는데, 글의 시작은 흥미롭게도 북한의 핵실험에 대한 PSI에 우리 남한이 참여하지 않기로 한 것에서 출발하고 있습니다. 그러면서 동아시아에 나토와 같은 집단적(미국 중심의) 동맹체제가 구축되어 있다면, (거기에 한국은 당연히 참가하는 것이지요.) 과연 한국이 그렇게 거부할 수 있었겠느냐고 반문하고 있습니다.
이러한 물음은 논리적으로는 앞뒤가 바뀐 것으로, 사실은 한국의 PSI참여의 거부가 동아시아에서 나토와 같은 미국 중심의 집단안보체제가 형성되기 어려운 사정을 방증하는 것으로 해석되어야 마땅할 것입니다. 그러나 하여튼 이번 글은 미 네오콘들의 대중국 정책, 대한반도 정책이 어디에서 어떻게 나오고 있는지 시사해주는 바가 크다고 생각합니다.
미국 네오콘들에게 한반도의 평화와 통일은 부수적인 일일 따름이며, 그들은 중국에 맞서 동아시아에서 미국의 패권을 유지하고 강화하는 데에 진력하고 있고, 한반도 정책은 그러한 구상의 일부분이라는 것이지요. 사실 6.25 전쟁도 시작은 내전이었지만 결국은 미국과 중국의 전쟁이 되어 버렸지요. 그리고 그 전쟁이 지금까지 단지 '정전상태'로 유지되고 있는 것이구요...
북한 문제도 6자회담이 잘되어 북한을 무장해제시키면 북한까지 미국 중심의 블록으로 가담시킬 수 있는 것이고(최소한 중국의 세력권을 축소하는 의미는 있을 것이지요), 6자회담이 안되어도 북한위협론을 빌미로 동아시아에 그와 같은 안보블록을 형성하는 데에 이익이 있을 것입니다.
6자회담에서 북한 문제를 중국에 맡긴 것도 그와 같은 심산이 깔려 있는 듯합니다. 즉 중국이 문제를 아주 잘 해결하여 북한이 핵을 폐기하고 개혁개방에 나서면, 북한은 결국 중국으로부터 멀어지게 될 것이고, 중국이 문제를 잘 해결하지 못하면, 이는 북한의 핵무장의 강화를 뜻하는데, 이는 동아시아에 미국 중심의 군사적 결속을 강화할 수 있는 빌미가 될 수 있는 것입니다.
A NATO for Asia
Helping South Korea despite itself.
Ellen Bork & Gary Schmitt
Weekly Standard
December 11, 2006
A bit of history comes to mind in the wake of South Korean president Roh's refusal delivered at the recent APEC summit in Hanoi to sign up as a full participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, the U.S.-led effort to prevent North Korea from trafficking in weapons of mass destruction.
In November 1983, the West German parliament voted to approve the deployment on German soil of medium-range Pershing II missiles as a deterrent to the Soviet Union's SS-20s. The Bundestag's approval, on a relatively close vote, came despite large antimissile demonstrations and broad public support for continued negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Both Chancellor Helmut Kohl and former chancellor Helmut Schmidt strongly supported the deployment. To be sure, in advance of the vote, Schmidt criticized the Reagan administration's "missionary ideological course" and defended dialogue with Moscow--but he then implored his party to "force themselves to be rational" and support deployment. The Social Democrats "cannot influence anyone to reason and moderation if the Soviet Union can exploit our actions and at the same time the people of the United States feel they have been left in the lurch," he argued.
Even allowing for his criticisms of the United States, Schmidt felt strongly about his country's mutual security obligations as a member of NATO and the difference between the totalitarian state on his border and the democratic friend that deterred it.
The same cannot be said of South Korea. In recent years, despite the tens of thousands of American troops there and the U.S. commitment to help defend it, South Korea has reacted to North Korea's nuclear program, missile tests, and grotesque human rights abuses with little concern for U.S. policy initiatives either toward North Korea or the security of the region. Now, South Korea's refusal to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative raises the question: Would Seoul behave differently if Asia, like Europe, had a regional security organization committed to the survival of freedom and democracy?
Currently, our Asian security arrangements run along bilateral lines from regional capitals to Washington. For decades, the conventional wisdom has been that this "hub and spokes" structure works well enough and that the multilateral system that has safeguarded Europe's security for decades would not work in Asia. Speaking of the applicability of a NATO-like organization for the region in 2002, then Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, "East Asia's a very, very different situation [from Europe], where the diversity of countries, the diversity of interests doesn't call for that kind of structure."
Asia's supposed "diversity of interests" generally refers to lingering anger over Japan's wartime aggression and brutality. Certainly, visits to the Yasukuni war shrine by Japanese leaders have hardly helped put those animosities to rest; indeed, they have given Beijing, in particular, a tool to stoke anti-Japanese fires throughout the region. Moreover, when NATO was being built, its core consisted of democracies like Great Britain, France, and West Germany. In contrast, Washington's key Asian allies at the time were more of a mixed lot: defeated Japan and democratic Australia on the one hand, authoritarian South Korea and the Republic of China on the other.
The situation of course has changed since them. A wave of democratization that began in the 1980s swept up the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Indonesia has joined the democratic club as well.
New security problems have also emerged. In addition to the nuclear and missile threat posed by North Korea, China's economic growth has enabled it to develop a military capacity that now not only threatens Taiwan but is of growing concern to Japan and East Asia as a whole.
None of these momentous changes is reflected in Asia's multilateral organizations, which downplay the importance of democratic principles and emphasize trade and talk instead. Not surprisingly, Washington's efforts to have these organizations take on security roles are so far largely unproductive. In the meantime, China has begun to assert a regional leadership role which increasingly comes at the expense of the United States.
The objection that Asia's past is an obstacle to updating the region's security arrangements misses the point. In fact, tension between Japan and other countries in the region--especially in light of Tokyo's desire to revise its pacifist constitution and take on a greater role in global security affairs--can be best managed by enmeshing Japan in a multilateral alliance of democracies.
Other problems would also be best solved within such a framework. For example, the incentives and constraints of an alliance structure could help Indonesia to transform its military into a transparent, humane force under civilian control. Much in the manner of NATO (and the European Union of recent years), such an alliance would serve as a magnet to countries that have not yet democratized and could help to prevent backsliding in those that have, be they Thailand or the Philippines.
The historical parallels between West Germany in the 1980s and South Korea today are striking: Both had a population divided between a ruthless totalitarian system and a free, democratic society; anti-American sentiment runs strong in both, especially among the young. Both also have leaders who must strike a difficult balance between their publics and their international obligations.
The major difference may be that one belonged to an alliance committed to safeguarding a free society with the help of its loyal friends, while the other sees its alliance with the United States as serving little more than a set of interests narrowly conceived.
Ellen Bork is deputy executive director of the Project for the New American Century and Gary Schmitt is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
http://www.newamericancentury.org/asia-20061211.htm
아래는 미국 네오콘들의 사이트인 '새로운 미국의 세기를 위한 기획(Project for the New American Century)'에서 퍼온 것인데요, 그 사이트( http://www.newamericancentury.org )의 동아시아 부분의 글들을 보면, 그들의 중국에 대한 관심과 경계가 얼마나 큰지 실감하게 됩니다. 그리고 그 가운데 대북 정책에 대한 권고도 간혹 끼여 있는 것을 볼 수 있습니다. 당연한 얘기인지도 모르지만, 미 부시 정부의 대북정책은 그들의 동아시아 전략이라는 큰 틀에서 이해되어야 할 것입니다.
이번 글도 제목은 '아시아에 나토를'이라고 되어 있는데, 글의 시작은 흥미롭게도 북한의 핵실험에 대한 PSI에 우리 남한이 참여하지 않기로 한 것에서 출발하고 있습니다. 그러면서 동아시아에 나토와 같은 집단적(미국 중심의) 동맹체제가 구축되어 있다면, (거기에 한국은 당연히 참가하는 것이지요.) 과연 한국이 그렇게 거부할 수 있었겠느냐고 반문하고 있습니다.
이러한 물음은 논리적으로는 앞뒤가 바뀐 것으로, 사실은 한국의 PSI참여의 거부가 동아시아에서 나토와 같은 미국 중심의 집단안보체제가 형성되기 어려운 사정을 방증하는 것으로 해석되어야 마땅할 것입니다. 그러나 하여튼 이번 글은 미 네오콘들의 대중국 정책, 대한반도 정책이 어디에서 어떻게 나오고 있는지 시사해주는 바가 크다고 생각합니다.
미국 네오콘들에게 한반도의 평화와 통일은 부수적인 일일 따름이며, 그들은 중국에 맞서 동아시아에서 미국의 패권을 유지하고 강화하는 데에 진력하고 있고, 한반도 정책은 그러한 구상의 일부분이라는 것이지요. 사실 6.25 전쟁도 시작은 내전이었지만 결국은 미국과 중국의 전쟁이 되어 버렸지요. 그리고 그 전쟁이 지금까지 단지 '정전상태'로 유지되고 있는 것이구요...
북한 문제도 6자회담이 잘되어 북한을 무장해제시키면 북한까지 미국 중심의 블록으로 가담시킬 수 있는 것이고(최소한 중국의 세력권을 축소하는 의미는 있을 것이지요), 6자회담이 안되어도 북한위협론을 빌미로 동아시아에 그와 같은 안보블록을 형성하는 데에 이익이 있을 것입니다.
6자회담에서 북한 문제를 중국에 맡긴 것도 그와 같은 심산이 깔려 있는 듯합니다. 즉 중국이 문제를 아주 잘 해결하여 북한이 핵을 폐기하고 개혁개방에 나서면, 북한은 결국 중국으로부터 멀어지게 될 것이고, 중국이 문제를 잘 해결하지 못하면, 이는 북한의 핵무장의 강화를 뜻하는데, 이는 동아시아에 미국 중심의 군사적 결속을 강화할 수 있는 빌미가 될 수 있는 것입니다.
A NATO for Asia
Helping South Korea despite itself.
Ellen Bork & Gary Schmitt
Weekly Standard
December 11, 2006
A bit of history comes to mind in the wake of South Korean president Roh's refusal delivered at the recent APEC summit in Hanoi to sign up as a full participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, the U.S.-led effort to prevent North Korea from trafficking in weapons of mass destruction.
In November 1983, the West German parliament voted to approve the deployment on German soil of medium-range Pershing II missiles as a deterrent to the Soviet Union's SS-20s. The Bundestag's approval, on a relatively close vote, came despite large antimissile demonstrations and broad public support for continued negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Both Chancellor Helmut Kohl and former chancellor Helmut Schmidt strongly supported the deployment. To be sure, in advance of the vote, Schmidt criticized the Reagan administration's "missionary ideological course" and defended dialogue with Moscow--but he then implored his party to "force themselves to be rational" and support deployment. The Social Democrats "cannot influence anyone to reason and moderation if the Soviet Union can exploit our actions and at the same time the people of the United States feel they have been left in the lurch," he argued.
Even allowing for his criticisms of the United States, Schmidt felt strongly about his country's mutual security obligations as a member of NATO and the difference between the totalitarian state on his border and the democratic friend that deterred it.
The same cannot be said of South Korea. In recent years, despite the tens of thousands of American troops there and the U.S. commitment to help defend it, South Korea has reacted to North Korea's nuclear program, missile tests, and grotesque human rights abuses with little concern for U.S. policy initiatives either toward North Korea or the security of the region. Now, South Korea's refusal to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative raises the question: Would Seoul behave differently if Asia, like Europe, had a regional security organization committed to the survival of freedom and democracy?
Currently, our Asian security arrangements run along bilateral lines from regional capitals to Washington. For decades, the conventional wisdom has been that this "hub and spokes" structure works well enough and that the multilateral system that has safeguarded Europe's security for decades would not work in Asia. Speaking of the applicability of a NATO-like organization for the region in 2002, then Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, "East Asia's a very, very different situation [from Europe], where the diversity of countries, the diversity of interests doesn't call for that kind of structure."
Asia's supposed "diversity of interests" generally refers to lingering anger over Japan's wartime aggression and brutality. Certainly, visits to the Yasukuni war shrine by Japanese leaders have hardly helped put those animosities to rest; indeed, they have given Beijing, in particular, a tool to stoke anti-Japanese fires throughout the region. Moreover, when NATO was being built, its core consisted of democracies like Great Britain, France, and West Germany. In contrast, Washington's key Asian allies at the time were more of a mixed lot: defeated Japan and democratic Australia on the one hand, authoritarian South Korea and the Republic of China on the other.
The situation of course has changed since them. A wave of democratization that began in the 1980s swept up the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Indonesia has joined the democratic club as well.
New security problems have also emerged. In addition to the nuclear and missile threat posed by North Korea, China's economic growth has enabled it to develop a military capacity that now not only threatens Taiwan but is of growing concern to Japan and East Asia as a whole.
None of these momentous changes is reflected in Asia's multilateral organizations, which downplay the importance of democratic principles and emphasize trade and talk instead. Not surprisingly, Washington's efforts to have these organizations take on security roles are so far largely unproductive. In the meantime, China has begun to assert a regional leadership role which increasingly comes at the expense of the United States.
The objection that Asia's past is an obstacle to updating the region's security arrangements misses the point. In fact, tension between Japan and other countries in the region--especially in light of Tokyo's desire to revise its pacifist constitution and take on a greater role in global security affairs--can be best managed by enmeshing Japan in a multilateral alliance of democracies.
Other problems would also be best solved within such a framework. For example, the incentives and constraints of an alliance structure could help Indonesia to transform its military into a transparent, humane force under civilian control. Much in the manner of NATO (and the European Union of recent years), such an alliance would serve as a magnet to countries that have not yet democratized and could help to prevent backsliding in those that have, be they Thailand or the Philippines.
The historical parallels between West Germany in the 1980s and South Korea today are striking: Both had a population divided between a ruthless totalitarian system and a free, democratic society; anti-American sentiment runs strong in both, especially among the young. Both also have leaders who must strike a difficult balance between their publics and their international obligations.
The major difference may be that one belonged to an alliance committed to safeguarding a free society with the help of its loyal friends, while the other sees its alliance with the United States as serving little more than a set of interests narrowly conceived.
Ellen Bork is deputy executive director of the Project for the New American Century and Gary Schmitt is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
http://www.newamericancentury.org/asia-20061211.htm
http://delsa.or.kr/xe/index.php?document_srl=3151
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